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In many respects 2009 has been a difficult year
for South Africans as far as service delivery
protest marches, wage strikes and other events are
concerned. These incidents have managed to
cause chaos in some parts of the country, yet,
ironically have served at the same time to
demonstrate South Africa's readiness for the 2010
FIFA World Cup (FWC). Throughout, South
Africans have been focused on one goal – to host
a successful FWC in 2010. Key to a successful
FWC will be the ability of the police and other
law enforcement agencies to ensure the security of
the event. Since the 2004 announcement that
South Africa would be hosting the FWC, the
South African Police Service (SAPS) has been
actively preparing for the event. However,
organisational restructuring, combating crime,
training, as well as dealing with the protests,
strikes and xenophobic violence that emerge from
time to time has given the SAPS more than enough
to cope with.
PROTESTS AND STRIKES
The country experienced a wave of service delivery
protests and wage strikes during the first half of
this year. By end July, twenty-four major protests
were recorded.1 Of these, 24 per cent took place in
Gauteng, 16 per cent in North West, Mpumalanga
and Western Cape, and 12 per cent in Limpopo.2
The unrest incidents in the other provinces range
in the region of four to eight per cent.3 Experts
predict that protest actions in 2009 are likely to
escalate beyond those of 2007 and 2008.4
While most protest actions have been related to
service delivery and wage issues, several of the
protests have taken on strong xenophobic
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overtones, raising the spectre of a resurgence of
last year's crisis. Most concerning in relation to
these incidents is the high level of violence and
damage to property associated with the protests.
The Gauteng Provincial Government has also
accused criminal elements of 'hijacking' and
'fuelling' protests in Gauteng.5 Government leaders
have been quick to condemn the violence and
warned perpetrators that the police will act
against them. President Zuma recently stated: 
Our Constitution allows our people to exercise
the right of freedom of assembly and
expression, and to protest where they feel they
need to, but this must be done within the ambit
of the law.6
In many instances the police did resort to using
rubber bullets to disperse crowds. Police action in
these instances was labelled as 'aggressive' by the
general public and some media and was even
compared to that of the riot police during the 80s
and early 90s. According to SAPS procedures, the
use of rubber bullets should be a last resort.
Negotiations between the police and protestors are
a prescribed first measure and should be exercised
before any hard action is taken. While it may be
that the hard line taken by the police is a response
to messages from political leaders that encourage
the police to act against criminals, it is more likely
that it is a consequence of restructuring within the
SAPS that negatively impacted on performance,
particularly that of the Public Order Police (POP)
units. 
In 2006 the POP units underwent an
organisational restructuring that reduced their
capacity. Prior to the restructuring process, there
were 7 227 POP members nationally in 43 units.
After the restructuring, there were only 2 595 POP
members and 23 units. The xenophobic attacks in
2008 prompted the SAPS to increase their crowd
management capacity once again as the shortage
of POP members during the xenophobic incidents
was strongly highlighted. Currently there are 3
306 POP members in 27 units. By the end of
December 2009 there are expected to be 5 661
POP members and 29 units (see the following
table for information on capacity). 
During 2009 the depleted units had to deal with
huge demands on their services. Police station
members and Metro Police officers, who are
equipped with only level-one training in crowd
management (POP members have the requisite
level-three training) have not been able to provide
sufficient support and assistance. In addition,
station commissioners have been reluctant to
release station members to perform crowd
management duties, due to other station priorities.7
In-service training, a routine continuous training
requirement for members trained in crowd
management, is also never systematically
undertaken by station members. This raises doubts
about their ability to deal with situations they may
face.
NATIONAL ELECTIONS AND
SPORTING EVENTS 
National elections
Policing the South African general elections in 2009
was given high priority status by the SAPS, due to
the high level of political tension in the country,
and the resurgence of political violence. The
increased tension and violence was a consequence
of several factors:
• Tensions between the Mbeki/Zuma factions 
before and after the ANC's Polokwane
Conference in December 2008 and the
concomitant ousting of Mbeki as the ANC and
South African president 
• The establishment of COPE, a splinter of the 
ANC  
Table 1: SAPS national public order capacity
before and after restructuring
10 Institute for Security Studies
No of 
members 7 227 2 595 3 306 5 661
No of 
units 43 23 27 29
POP 
before
restruc-
turing
in 2006
POP 
after
restruc-
turing 
in 2006
Increase
after 2008:
current
POP
capacity
Expected
POP
capacity
by end
Dec 2009
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Indian Premier League
To exacerbate the situation, the Indian Premier
League (IPL) cricket tournament, that had not
been on the police's agenda for this period, also
had to be policed. The SAPS was not consulted
or informed of the event and became aware of
the event via media reports, despite the fact that
the SAPS would be primarily responsible for
security.11 Fortunately the IPL cricket tour
remained violence free, but police still had to be
deployed to the event. Although the elections
were largely peacefully concluded, the police
recorded a number of incidents of political
intolerance and criminal offences. Twenty-eight
incidents were recorded on the day preceding the
elections, and 85 incidents were recorded on
election day.12
Lions tour
The British and Irish Lions tour was well planned
and organisation started months before the event.
The South African government, the SAPS and
the South African Rugby Union, in conjunction
with the Irish and British embassies, were all
involved.13 The major unplanned-for challenge
was the logistics regarding venues that almost
clashed with that of the FIFA Confederations
Cup.14 Despite this, there were no major security
challenges during the Lions Tour.15
THE CONFEDERATIONS CUP
EXPERIENCE
The FIFA Confederations Cup (FCC) ended on a
high note on 28 June, bringing to a close a two-
week event presented in four stadiums in three
provinces. In his first budget vote speech in
Parliament on 1 July 2009 the new Deputy
Minister of Police, Fikile Mbalula, made the
following remark in relation to the security of
this event:
We dare declare … that the Confederations
Cup was a resounding success held in a safe
and secure environment, with no major crime
incidents directly related to the tournament
reported.16
• The continuation of the historical political 
violence between the IFP and the ANC and
the resurgence of violence prior to the
elections
There were 40 actual incidents of violence that
occurred in the lead up to the elections.8 (See
also the article on election violence by David
Bruce in SACQ 28, June 2009).
SAPS deployment for the elections was informed
by the abovementioned factors and the
identification of key conflict zones and polling
stations that held potential for violent outbreaks. 
Apart from mobilising local Visible Police
(VISPOL) members from police stations and
other specialised units from the respective
provinces, a national deployment consisting of 40
senior officers from the national VISPOL
division were on duty in all nine provinces.
Senior officers from other SAPS national
divisions were posted to voting stations in
Gauteng. 
KwaZulu-Natal received the bulk of police
human resources as a result of heightened
tensions and violence preceding the elections in
Nongoma in Northern KwaZulu-Natal, Wembezi
in the Natal Midlands, and Greytown. Sixty
National Intervention Unit (NIU) members – the
SAPS specialist task team deployed solely for
high to medium risk operations – were deployed
to assist police in KwaZulu-Natal, in addition to
Public Order Police (POP) platoons from
Limpopo, North West and Gauteng. The South
African National Defence Force (SANDF) was
also deployed at key points to assist and support
the SAPS if and when the need should arise. 
Given their crowd management expertise, POP
members have a key role to play in these types of
events. However, as previously explained, their
human resource and physical capacity had been
reduced by 50 per cent. There were only 643 POP
members in KwaZulu-Natal,9 whereas the ideal
number would have been 1 286.10 Thus, those
responsible for crowd management during the
election faced a shortage of 643 members, a
situation that created difficulties for the police. 
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FIFA President Sepp Blatter gave South Africa 7,5
out of 10.17 While the two and a half points lost
were ascribed to concerns about transport and
accommodation, Blatter did express a concern
about crowd management outside the stadium.18
There can be little doubt that to FIFA, and many
others, the FCC was a test, a dry run, for the 'real
thing', i.e. the FIFA Soccer World Cup (FWC) in
2010. Since this article is primarily concerned
with the security of the FWC, it is necessary to
consider the outcome of this 'test' by looking at
the FCC security operations, lessons learnt and
the security prospects for 2010.
Security operations
At a press conference in Pretoria on 29 June 2009
the National Joint Operational and Intelligence
Structure (NATJOINTS)19 provided a briefing on
the security operations for the FCC. According to
the NATJOINTS press release the 'overall concept
of operations' applied during the FCC is based on
the operational concept developed for the FWC.20
This concept requires a comprehensive integrated
approach between the NATJOINTS, responsible
for national security (including crime combating
and law enforcement operations) and the FIFA
Local Organising Committee (LOC), responsible
for event-specific security with the aid of private
security companies.21
At the media briefing on the success of the FCC it
was reported that security operations included
seeing to the safety of players, officials and fans in
and around the stadiums on both match and non-
match days.22 The incidence of all crimes within a
radius of one kilometre of the four stadiums,
practice venues and FIFA hotels was monitored
and analysed on a twenty-four hour basis for
purposes of targeted deployment of the security
services (SAPS, Metro Police and private security).
The security services also provided close
protection units for the participating teams at all
times, as well as for identified FIFA dignitaries.23
They deployed between 6 000 and 8 000 members
for security operations in host cities, with
specialised high-risk forces comprising members
of the SAPS Special Task Force and the SANDF
Special Forces on standby for emergency
situations. Five hundred and fifty railway police
members were deployed on special trains that
transported fans to and from stadiums. Due to late
applications by, and contracts for, some private
security companies, the police were obliged to
provide an additional 750 members for inner-
perimeter security at Loftus Versfeld, Ellis Park
and the Royal Bafokeng stadium.24 According to
the NATJOINTS the special detective teams that
were appointed for all FCC related crimes and the
dedicated courts that were established for the
same purpose worked particularly well and will be
duplicated during the FWC.25
Impact of the security operations
The NATJOINTS claim that the targeted security
operations (high density policing) during the two
weeks of the FCC led to a 'dramatic' decrease in
crimes such as murder, attempted murder,
aggravated robbery, car theft and sexual assaults in
the areas surrounding the stadiums, compared to
the same period in 2008.26 This is in spite of the
fact that almost 600 000 people attended the
sixteen matches. According to the NATJOINTS,
39 cases of criminal conduct that could be linked
to the stadiums, the immediate vicinity of the
stadiums and the hotels hosting the teams, were
reported. Most of these were theft cases, in
particular of cell phones; five were robberies
(muggings); one was for reckless driving; two were
for corruption; one was for assault; and one was
for the use of counterfeit money.27 This amounts to
one crime per ten thousand spectators.28 The
police arrested 25 suspects in connection with
these crimes. In addition, as a result of the police's
targeted crime combating operations in the
vicinity (outer perimeter) of the designated areas
(stadiums, hotels, practice venues, etc), they also
arrested about 2 000 suspects for crimes unrelated
to the FCC.29
LESSONS LEARNT
The series of events and incidents in and before
2009 has in many ways prepared South Africa for
next year's FWC. The challenge now lies in how
these lessons are adopted and implemented. 
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FIFA Confederations Cup lessons30
• The current approach to integrate and 
coordinate the work of various government
departments through the JOINTS (Joint
Operational and Intelligence Structure)
system is working well and provides a firm
tried and tested platform for the security of
the FWC
• The joint exercises organised by the 
NATJOINTS before events such as the FCC
and the FWC, to identify what works and
what doesn't, were successful, but it also
showed that more of these exercises, as well as
more interdepartmental training, are needed
• The late applications by and deployment of 
private security firms highlighted the
deficiencies in relation to the current tender
and contracting system of the LOC, and the
need to address these. In this regard the
Minister of Police also appointed a PSIRA
(Private Security Regulatory Authority) task
team to investigate the actions of the LOC and
certain private security companies against the
requirements of the PSIRA Act (Act 56 of
2001)31
• It is important to develop guidelines that 
provide role clarification between the various
branches of the security establishment, in
particular between the SAPS, Metro Police
Services and private security companies 
• There is a need to review the existing 
guidelines for security at Public Viewing
Areas (Fan Parks)
• The resources of the Disaster Management 
structures at local level need urgent attention
• Despite the division of responsibilities 
between security role players the SAPS
remains overall responsible for security and
should therefore always maintain a reserve
that could fill any gap created by the non-
performance of any of the other role players
Other lessons
• Heavy police presence in hotspots during the 
elections no doubt made a difference in
deterring would-be transgressors. Intensive
planning and improved crime analysis, as well
as closer cooperation with other SAPS
divisions prior to the elections aided in the
success of the elections
• South African government and non-
government agencies must coordinate events
to avoid unexpected surprises and overlap of
events for the security agencies, such as those
that occurred with the IPL cricket tournament
and the elections, as well as the FCC
tournament and the Lions Rugby Tour
• Service delivery protests and wage strikes will 
most probably be repeated next year because
of the bargaining opportunities for protesters
and strikers created by South Africa's desire to
present a successful FWC. Government needs
to be prepared to deal with a recurrence of
these actions on a much larger scale. The
SAPS too have to be prepared 
• Given the violent intensity of the protests in 
2009 and the continuing high levels of
discontent, the likelihood that the same
behaviour will be repeated next year is strong 
• Wage protests generally occur between April 
and July each year. This means that protests
and wage strikes will in all probability
coincide with the FIFA World Cup in June.
Government has to take cognisance of this to
avoid disruptions and embarrassment in 2010
• The likelihood that xenophobic attacks will 
recur is strong. Plans to address this have to be
in place (see the article by Monson and
Misago in this edition of SACQ)
• It is not in the public interest to arrest violent 
protestors and release them without some sort
of penalty 
SECURITY PROSPECTS FOR THE
2010 FWC
On the basis of our experience with the security
of big events in 2009 (and before), and an analysis
of our security situation in general, as well as the
NATJOINTS planning for the FWC, it is possible
to identify some of the real and potential threats
that the security services may be faced with in
2010. In response to these an indication will be
given of the extent of the security machinery
responsible for this event.
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Security threats 
Crime is all about precipitating (opportunity) and
predisposing (inclination) factors coming
together at the same time. In this regard the FWC
will be an ideal facilitator for crime, keeping in
mind that in addition to local South Africans who
will attend FWC matches in large numbers,
another estimated 450 000 international visitors
are expected. No doubt the vast majority of these
will be here for one of the greatest sporting events
on earth, but there will be those, locals and
visitors, for whom this event is just an extremely
attractive opportunity to enrich themselves
through illegal means.
Of course there always is the danger of crimes
that are motivated by reasons other than greed,
such as terrorism. South Africa does not presently
face any direct threat of terrorism, but with the
diversity of countries that will participate in the
FWC, some representing opposing political and
religious beliefs, this country will have to plan
and prepare for such a contingency.
In general, however, the security threats in
relation to the FWC will come from opportunistic
and organised criminals. In many ways, although
South Africa still experiences extraordinary high
levels of crime, especially violent crime, the
country has made some positive strides towards
decreasing its crime levels. For example, our
overall crime rate has decreased over the last four
years by more than 24 per cent, and our murder
rate has come down on a consistent basis since
1994 by more than 40 per cent (although it
remains more than seven times that of the United
States). We also know that approximately 80 per
cent of murders happen between people who
know each other,32 in other words, in a particular
context that poses no direct threat to strangers. 
The violent crimes that continue to plague this
country and negatively impact on the general and
personal perceptions of safety are the so-called
Trio Crimes (house robbery, business robbery
and car hijackings), as sub-categories of
aggravated robbery.33 House robberies have been
on the increase since this crime type was first
monitored in 2002/03, from 9 063 to 14 481 in
2007/08.34 Business robbery started to increase
between 2004/05 and 2007/8, from 3 320 to 9 862;
and car hijackings increased from 12 434 in
2004/05 to 14 201 in 2007/08. However, street
robbery (muggings) still constitutes about 66 per
cent of all aggravated robberies35 and should be
regarded as potentially the biggest crime threat
that visitors to the FWC may encounter in 2010.
Other security threats include the activities of
organised crime syndicates who may target the
FWC in terms of cyber crime, drugs, and crimes
related to the sex industry. In the latter case it is
particularly human trafficking, aimed at the
sexual exploitation of women and children, that
poses a concern.
Finally, although not directly criminal, there
should be concern that the successful hosting of
the FWC might be exploited by unions and other
dissatisfied groups to hold government (and other
employers) ransom through their demands.   
Security machinery for the FWC
The security machinery for major events such as
the FWC is fairly sophisticated and to the
uninformed extremely complicated. In essence,
however, it comprises the JOINTS (NATJOINTS
at national level, with provincial JOINTS
(PROVJOINTS) and local JOINTS
(LOCJOINTS).36 A JOINTS Planning Team for
the security planning of every major event is
established under the direct control of the SAPS
Deputy National Commissioner for Operational
Services. In the case of the FWC the Security
Directorate of the FIFA Local Organising
Committee (LOC) is expected to work closely
with the above committees and later also with the
operational committees. As indicated above, the
Security Directorate is responsible for event
security and the JOINTS for national security.
Joint planning therefore is aimed at the
integration of their plans and to clarify their roles.  
Immediately prior to the start of the event the
Planning Team is replaced by a Joint Operations
Committee (JOCOM), which directs the
14 Institute for Security Studies
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operation through a network of Joint Operation
Centres (JOCs) and Venue Operation Centres
(VOCs). The key responsibility for all of the above
is the effective coordination and cooperation
between all role players. In addition, these
structures must ensure that the operation runs
according to plan and that all contingencies are
effectively dealt with. 
The bulk of the resources (human and material)
for the FWC security operation comes from the
SAPS, with additional resources deployed by the
Metro Police Services, the South African National
Defence Force (SANDF), the intelligence
community, Disaster Management and others (e.g.
special dedicated courts set up by the Department
of Justice). It is estimated that approximately 50
000 members of the security services, excluding
private security, will be deployed to protect the
FWC. Of the latter number 41 000 will be
members of the SAPS. In this regard the personnel
expansion of the SAPS over the last eight years,
from approximately 120 000 in 2000/01 to 183 000
in 2009, will enable the SAPS to deploy sufficient
force levels, hopefully without neglecting policing
in general. The approved target for the SAPS in
2010 is 193 000. In addition to having more
personnel the SAPS already have or are in the
process of procuring additional and sophisticated
equipment that will enhance their operational
capability during 2010 and beyond.37 These
include mobile command centres, mobile water
cannons, helicopters, bomb squad equipment,
satellite imaging systems, etc. 
All of the above resources are to be deployed as
part of an extremely comprehensive operational
plan that provides, inter alia, for crime prevention
and combating operations, VIP protection, border
security (including air- and seaports), borderline
security (including air and sea security), transport
and route security, tourism security and
contingency planning for specific security
threats.38
CONCLUSION 
There is little doubt that in spite of South Africa's
relatively high crime levels, the state has the will
and the capacity to provide high quality security
for the World Cup. The security plan is
comprehensive and adequately resourced, and with
the experience accumulated and lessons learnt
over the last number of years, in particular with
the recent events in 2009, the security services
should be able to further hone their plan.
However, there are a few remaining concerns.
Despite a SAPS personnel increase of more than
60 000 over the last eight years, key units such as
the Public Order Police units were restructured to
under half their original personnel strength,
ostensibly to strengthen police stations. Given the
crucial role of these units for the policing of major
events such as the FWC, and for crowd
management in general, their current under-
resourcing is illogical and poses a critical risk
should the SAPS be required to deploy adequate
numbers of well-trained and equipped members
for crowd management during 2010. It is
important to re-establish these units to their
former strength (and perhaps further improve on
their capacity and equipment). A re-visit of the
procedures of the Regulations of Gatherings Act39
is also advised.
The continuing high levels of violent crime such as
street robbery and other forms of aggravated
robbery, if not addressed, may become a source of
national embarrassment in 2010 and may even
deter potential visitors from coming to South
Africa. 
To comment on this article visit
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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